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Abstract. Active cyber defense is one important defensive method for
combating cyber attacks. Unlike traditional defensive methods such as
firewall-based filtering and anti-malware tools, active cyber defense is
based on spreading “white” or “benign” worms to combat against the
attackers’ malwares (i.e., malicious worms) that also spread over the
network. In this paper, we initiate the study of optimal active cyber
defense in the setting of strategic attackers and/or strategic defenders.
Specifically, we investigate infinite-time horizon optimal control and fast
optimal control for strategic defenders (who want to minimize their cost)
against non-strategic attackers (who do not consider the issue of cost).
We also investigate the Nash equilibria for strategic defenders and attack-
ers. We discuss the cyber security meanings/implications of the theoretic
results. Our study brings interesting open problems for future research.
Keywords: cyber security model, active cyber defense, optimization,
epidemic model
1 Introduction
The importance of cyber security is well recognized now. However, our under-
standing of cyber security is still at its infant stage. In general, the attackers are
constantly escalating their attack power and sophistication, while the defenders
largely lag behind. To be specific, we mention the following asymmetry between
cyber attack and cyber defense: The effect of malware-like attacks is automati-
cally amplified by the network connectivity, while the defense effect is not. This
phenomenon had been implied by many previous results (e.g., [28, 9, 6, 26, 34]),
but was not explicitly pointed out until very recently [35]. The asymmetry is fun-
damentally caused by that the defense is reactive, including intrusion detection
systems, firewalls and anti-malware tools. The asymmetry can be eliminated by
the idea of active cyber defense [35], where the defender also aims to take ad-
vantage of the network connectivity. The concept of active cyber defense is not
completely new because researchers have proposed for years the idea of using the
defender’s “white” or “benign” worms to combat against the attackers’ malwares
[5, 1, 29, 23, 16, 18, 13, 30]. In a sense, active cyber defense already happened in
practice; for example, the Welchia worm attempted to “kill” the Blaster worm in
compromised computers [23, 20]. It appears that full-fledged active cyber defense
is perhaps inevitable in the near future according to some recent reports [18, 24,
31]. It is therefore more imperative than ever to systematically characterize the
effectiveness of active cyber defense. This motivates the present study.
1.1 Our Contributions
This paper is inspired by the recent mathematical model of active cyber de-
fense dynamics [35], which characterizes the effect of various model parameters
(including the underlying complex network structures) in the setting where nei-
ther the attacker nor the defender is strategic (i.e., both the attacker and the
defender do not consider the issue of cost). Here we study a new perspective of
active cyber defense, namely the strategic interaction between the attacker and
the defender. On one hand, our study moves a step beyond [35] because we in-
corporate control-theoretic and game-theoretic models to accommodate strategic
interactions. On the other hand, our study assumes away the underlying complex
network structures that are explicitly investigated in [35]. This means that our
study is essentially based on the homogeneous (or well-mixed) assumption that
each compromised computer can attack the same portion of computers. Tackling
the problem of strategic attack-defense interactions with explicit complex net-
work structures is left for future research. Therefore, we deem the present paper
as a significant first step toward ultimately understanding the effectiveness of
strategic active cyber defense. Specifically, we make the following contributions.
First, we investigate two flavors of optimal control for strategic defenders
against non-strategic attackers: infinite-time horizon optimal control and fast
optimal control. In the setting of infinite-time horizon optimal control for the
defender, we characterize the conditions under which the defender should adjust
its active cyber defense power in a certain quantitative fashion. For example, we
identify a condition under which the defender should give up using active cyber
defense alone, and instead should resort to other defense methods as well (e.g.,
proactive defense). In the setting of fast optimal control, where the defender
wants to occupy a certain portion of the network as soon as possible and at the
minimal cost, there is a significant difference between the case that the active
defense cost is linear and the case that the active defense cost is quadratic.
Second, we identify the Nash equilibrium strategies when both the defender
and the attacker are strategic. The findings are interesting. For example, when
the defender (or attacker) is reluctant to use/expose its advanced active cyber
defense tools (or zero-day exploits), it will give up escalating its active defense
(or attack) power; otherwise, there are three scenarios: (i) If the defender (or
attacker) initially occupies only a certain small portion of the network, it will
give up escalating its active defense (or attack). (ii) If the defender (or attacker)
initially occupies a certain significant portion of the network, it will escalate its
active defense (or attack) as much as possible. (iii) If the defender (or attacker)
initially occupies a certain large portion of the network, it will not escalate its
active defense (or attack) — a sort of diminishing returns.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the
related prior work. Section 3 describes the basic active cyber defense model under
the homogeneous assumption. Section 4 investigates optimal control for strategic
defenders against non-strategic attackers. Section 5 studies Nash equilibria for
strategic defenders and attackers. Section 6 concludes the paper with some open
problems. Lengthy proofs are deferred to the Appendix. The main notations
used in the paper are listed below:
αB, αR defender B’s defense power αB and attacker R’s attack power αR
iB(t), iR(t) portions of the nodes occupied respectively by the defender and the
attacker at time t, where iB(t) + iR(t) = 1
piB, piB(t) piB is control variable and piB(t) is control function
pˆiB solution in the infinite-time horizon optimal control case
pi∗B, pi
∗∗
B solutions in the case of fast optimal control with linear and
quadratic cost functions, respectively
z discount rate
kB normalization ratio between the defender’s detection cost and re-
covery cost
λ normalization ratio between the unit of time and the defender’s
active defense cost
kR normalization ratio between the attacker’s maintenance cost and
penetration cost
2 Related Work
Our investigation is built on recent studies in mathematical computer malware
models. These models originated in the mathematical biological epidemic models
introduced in the 1920’s [19, 12], which were first adapted to study the spread-
ing of computer virus in the 1990’s [10, 11]. All these models made the homo-
geneous assumption that each individual (e.g., computer) in the population has
equally infection effect on the other individuals in the population, and the as-
sumption that the infected individuals recover because of reactive defense (e.g.,
anti-malware tools). In the past decade, there were many studies that aim to
eliminate the aforementioned homogeneous assumption, by explicitly incorporat-
ing the heterogeneous network structures [28, 9, 6, 26, 34, 32]. The mathematical
tools used for these studies are Dynamical Systems in nature. These studies
demonstrated that the attack effect of malware spreading against reactive de-
fense is automatically amplified by the largest eigenvalue of the adjacency ma-
trix, which represents the underlying complex network structure. This is the
attack-defense asymmetry phenomenon mentioned above.
The attack-defense asymmetry phenomenon motivated the study of mathe-
matical models of active cyber defense [35], which is a relatively new sub-field
in cyber security [18, 24, 31] as previous explorations were mainly geared toward
legal and policy issues [5, 1, 29, 23, 16, 18, 13, 30]. One real-life incident of the fla-
vor of active cyber defense is that the Welchia worm attempted to “kick out”
another kind of worms (e.g., the Blaster worm) [23, 20]. In the first mathemat-
ical characterization of active cyber defense [35], neither the attacker nor the
defender is strategic (i.e., they do not consider the issue of cost), albeit the
model accommodates the underlying complex network structure. In the present
paper, we move a step toward ultimately understanding optimal active cyber
defense, where the attacker and/or the defender are/is strategic (i.e., they want
to minimize their cost). Finally, we note that automatic patching [27] is not ac-
tive cyber defense because automatic patching aims to prevent attacks, whereas
active cyber defense aims to identify and possibly clean up infected computers.
There have been many studies (e.g., [33, 21, 8, 4, 14, 22, 15, 25]) on applying
Control Theory and Game Theory to understand various issues related to com-
puter malware spreading. Our study is somewhat inspired by the botnet-defense
model investigated in [4]. All the studies mentioned above only considered reac-
tive defense; whereas we investigate how to optimize active cyber defense. For
general information about the applications of Control Theory and Game Theory
to cyber security, we refer to [2, 17] and the references therein.
3 The Basic Active Cyber Defense Model
Consider a population of nodes, which can abstract computers in a cyber system.
At any point in time, a node is either occupied by defender B (i.e., the node is
secure), or occupied by attacker R (i.e., the node is compromised). Denote by
iB(t) the portion of nodes that are occupied by the defender at time t, and by
iR(t) the portion of nodes that are occupied by the attacker at time t, where
iB(t)+iR(t) = 1 for any t ≥ 0. In the interaction between cyber attack and active
cyber defense, the defender and the attacker can “grab” nodes from each other
in the same fashion. Let αB abstract defender B’s power in grabbing attacker-
occupied nodes using active cyber defense, and αR abstract attackerR’s power in
compromising defender-occupied nodes using malware-like cyber attacks. Under
the homogeneous assumption that (i) each secure node has the same power in
“grabbing” the attacker-occupied nodes and (ii) each compromised node has
the same power in compromising the defender-occupied nodes, we obtain the
following Dynamical System model:{
diB(t)
dt
= αBiB(t)iR(t)− αRiR(t)iB(t)
diR(t)
dt
= αRiR(t)iB(t)− αBiB(t)iR(t),
where iB(t) + iR(t) = 1, iB(t) ≥ 0, and iR(t) ≥ 0 for all t ≥ 0. Due to the
symmetry, we only need to consider
diB(t)
dt
= αBiB(t)(1 − iB(t))− αRiB(t)(1− iB(t)). (1)
If neither the attacker nor the defender is strategic (i.e., they do not consider
the issue of cost), the dynamics of system (1) can be characterized as follows.
– If the attacker is more powerful than the defender, namely αR > αB , the
attacker will occupy the entire network in the fashion of the Logistic equation
(i.e., when iR is small, iR increases slowly; when iR is around a threshold
value, iR increases exponentially; when iR is large, iR increases slowly).
– If the defender is more powerful than the attacker, namely αB > αR, the
defender will occupy the network in the same fashion as in the above case.
– If the attacker and the defender are equally powerful, namely αR = αB, the
system state is in equilibrium. In other words, iB(t) = iB(0) and iR(t) =
iR(0) = 1− iB(0) for any t > 0.
The above model accommodates non-strategic attackers and non-strategic de-
fenders, and is the starting point for our study of optimal active cyber defense.
4 Optimal Control for Strategic Defender Against
Non-Strategic Attacker
4.1 Infinite-time Horizon Optimal Control
In this setting, the non-strategic attacker R maintains a fixed degree of attack
power αR, while the defender B is strategic. That is, the strategic defender aims
to minimize its cost (specified below) by adjusting its defense power αB via
αB = b+ piB(a− b),
while obeying the dynamics of (1), where piB ∈ [0, 1] is the control variable and
αB ∈ [b, a] is the defender’s defense power with 1 ≥ a > b ≥ 0. The cost to the
defender consists of two parts.
– The recovery cost for recovering the compromised nodes to secure states
(e.g., re-installing the operating systems and updating the backup data files,
interference with the computers’ routine functions). We represent this cost by
fB(iB(t)) for some real-valued function fB(·). We assume f
′
B(·) < 0 because
the more nodes the defender occupies, the lower the cost for the defender to
recover the compromised nodes.
– The detection cost for detecting (or recognizing) compromised nodes via
active cyber defense, which partly depends on the attack’s evasiveness. We
represent this cost by kB ·piB(·), where kB is the normalization ratio between
the detection cost and the recovery cost, and piB(·) is the control function
that specifies the adjustable degree of active cyber defense power. This is
plausible because using more powerful active defense mechanisms (e.g., more
sophisticated/advanced “white” worms) causes a higher cost but allows the
defender to fight against the attacks more effectively.
The above definition of cost accommodates at least the following family of ac-
tive cyber defense: The defender uses “white” worms to detect the compromised
nodes, then possibly manually recovers the compromised nodes. This is perhaps
the most probable scenario because for example, the attacker’s malware may
have corrupted or deleted some data files in the compromised computers. Note
that the detection cost highlights the difference between (i) active-cyber-defense
based detection, where the defender’s detection tools (i.e., “white” worms) do
not reside on the compromised computers, and (ii) reactive-cyber-defense based
detection such as the current generation of anti-virus software, where the detec-
tion tools do not spread over the network.
Assuming that the attacker maintains a fixed degree of attack power αR,
the defender’s optimization goal is to minimize the total cost with a constant
discount rate z over an infinite-time horizon, namely
inf
0≤piB(·)≤1
{
JB(piB(·)) =
∫ ∞
0
e−zt(fB(iB(t)) + kB · piB(t))dt
}
, (2)
where f ′B(·) < 0, piB(·) ∈ [0, 1], and the attacker’s fixed degree of attack power αR
is treated as a constant. Now the optimization problem reduces to identifying
the optimal defense strategy pˆiB. To solve the minimization problem, we use
Pontryagin’s Minimum Principle to find the Hamiltonian associated to (2):
HB(iB, piB, p)
= fB(iB) + kBpiB + p[αBiB(1 − iB)− αRiB(1 − iB)]
= (kB + piB(1 − iB)(a− b))piB + fB(iB) + pbiB(1− iB)− pαRiB(1− iB),(3)
where p is the adjoint equation
{
p˙ = −∂HB
∂iB
+ zp = −f ′B(iB) + p[z − (αB − αR)(1− 2iB)]
p1(∞) = 0.
(4)
The optimal strategy pˆiB is obtained by minimizing the HamiltonianHB(iB , piB, p).
Since HB(iB, piB, p) is linear in piB, the optimal control strategy pˆiB takes the
following bang-bang control form:
pˆiB =


1 if ∂HB
∂piB
< 0
uB (0 < uB < 1, to be determined) if
∂HB
∂piB
= 0
0 if ∂HB
∂piB
> 0
(5)
where ∂HB
∂piB
= kB + piB(1 − iB)(a− b). In the singular form
∂HB
∂piB
= 0 and for a
period of time, we have
p =
−kB
iB(1− iB)(a− b)
. (6)
Further differentiating ∂HB
∂piB
with respect to t, we have
d
dt
(
∂HB
∂piB
)
= p˙iB(1− iB)(a− b) + p(1− 2iB)i˙B(a− b)
= iB(1− iB)(a− b)
{
− f ′B(iB) + p[z − (αB − αR)(1 − 2iB)]
}
+p(1− 2iB)(a− b)
{
αBiB(1 − iB)− αRiB(1 − iB)
}
= −iB(1− iB)(a− b)f
′
B(iB)− kBz
Define FB(iB) = −iB(1 − iB)(a − b)f
′
B(iB) − kBz. Then we need to study the
roots of FB(·) = 0.
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Fig. 1. Illustration of the roots of FB(iB) = 0 with fB(iB) = 1−iB , a−b = 1 and kBz =
1/8, where the x-axis represents iB and the y-axis represents y(iB) = iB(1− iB)(a−b).
The arrows indicate the directions the outcome under optimal control will head for.
Before presenting the results, we discuss the ideas behind them. In this paper,
we focus on case fB(iB) = 1 − iB, which can be easily extended to any linear
recovery-cost function. If kBz <
1
4 (a− b), then FB(iB) = 0 has two roots:
i1 =
1−
√
1− 4kBz
a−b
2
and i2 =
1 +
√
1− 4kBz
a−b
2
with 0 < i1 < i2 < 1. As illustrated in Figure 1, this implies

FB(iB) < 0 if iB < i1
FB(iB) > 0 if i1 < iB < i2
FB(iB) < 0 if iB > i2.
Then, the optimal strategy pˆiB of the singular form can be obtained by solving
i˙B |iB=i1 or iB=i2= 0.
Theorem 1. Suppose the non-strategic attacker maintains a fixed degree of at-
tack power αR, fB(iB) = 1− iB and kBz <
1
4 (a− b). Let i1 < i2 be the roots of
FB(iB) = 0. Let uB =
αR−b
a−b
. The optimal control strategy for defender B is:
pˆiB =


0 if iB < i1
uB if iB = i1
1 if i1 < iB < i2
uB if iB = i2
0 if iB > i2
. (7)
Proof of Theorem 1 is deferred to Appendix A. In practice, i1 and i2 can
be obtained numerically. Theorem 1 (also as illustrated in Figure 1) shows that
the outcome of the infinite-time horizon optimal control, namely limt→∞ iB(t),
depends on the initial system state iB(0) as follows:
– If 1 > iB(0) > i2, the defender should use the least powerful/costly active
defense mechanisms (i.e., αB = b) because pˆiB = 0. Moreover, the outcome
of the optimal defense is that the defender will occupy i2 portion of the
network, namely limt→∞ iB(t) = i2. This suggests a sort of diminishing
returns in active cyber defense: It is more cost-effective to pursue “good
enough” security (i.e., limt→∞ iB(t) = i2 < 1) than to pursue “perfect”
security (i.e., limt→∞ iB(t) = 1) even if it is possible.
– If 0 = iB(0) < i1, the defender should use the least powerful/costly active
defense mechanisms (i.e., αB = b) because pˆiB = 0. Moreover, the outcome
of the optimal defense is that the defender should give up (using active cyber
defense as the only defense methods), as the attacker will occupy the entire
network, namely limt→∞ iB(t) = 0. In other words, the defender should
resort to other defense methods as well (e.g., proactive defense).
– If iB(0) ∈ (i1, i2), the defender should use the most powerful/costly active
defense mechanisms (i.e., αB = a) because pˆiB = 1. Moreover, the outcome
of the optimal defense is that the defender will occupy i2 portion of the
network, namely limt→∞ iB(t) = i2. This also suggests a sort of diminishing
returns mentioned above.
– If iB(0) = i1 or iB(0) = i2, the defender should adjust its deployment
of active cyber defense mechanisms according to uB =
αR−b
a−b
, which means
αB = αR. Moreover, the outcome of the optimal defense is that iB(t) = iB(0)
for all t > 0.
Now we consider the degenerated scenarios of kBz ≥ 1/4(a− b). The proof
is similar to, but much simpler than, the proof of Theorem 1, and thus omitted.
Theorem 2. Suppose the non-strategic attacker maintains a fixed degree of at-
tack power αR and fB(iB) = 1− iB.
– If kBz = 1/4(a− b), then FB(iB) = 0 has only one root, i1 = i2 =
1
2 . The
optimal control strategy is
pˆiB =


0 if iB < i1
uB =
αR−b
a−b
if iB = i1
0 if iB > i1.
(8)
– If kBz > 1/4(a − b), then FB(iB) = 0 has no root. The optimal control
strategy is pˆiB = 0.
The cyber security implications of Theorem 2 are the following. In the case
kBz =
1
4 (a − b), the outcome under the optimal control depends on the initial
system state as follows:
– If 1 > iB(0) > i1, the defender should use the least powerful/costly active
cyber defense mechanisms because pˆiB = 0. The outcome is that the defender
will occupy i1 portion of the network, namely limt→∞ iB(t) = i1.
– If 0 = iB(0) < i1, the defender should use the least powerful/costly active
cyber defense mechanisms because pˆiB = 0. The outcome is that the defender
will give up using active cyber defense alone, as the attacker will occupy the
entire the network, namely limt→∞ iB(t) = 0. In other words, the defender
should resort to other defense methods as well (e.g., proactive defense).
– If iB(0) = i1, the defender will adjust its degree of active cyber defense power
according to pˆiB = uB =
αR−b
a−b
, which means αB = αR. The outcome is that
iB(t) = iB(0) for all t > 0.
In the case kBz > 1/4(a−b), the defender should use the least powerful/costly ac-
tive cyber defense mechanisms because pˆiB = 0. The outcome is that limt→∞ iB(t) =
0, meaning that the defender should give up using active cyber defense alone and
resort to other defense methods as well (e.g., proactive defense).
By considering Theorems 1 and 2 together, we draw some deeper insights.
Specifically, for a given z, different kB’s suggest different optimal active defense
strategies. More specifically, if kB >
1
4z (a− b), meaning that the cost of optimal
control is dominating, then defender B should use the least powerful/costly
active cyber defense mechanisms because pˆiB(t) = 0 for all t and the outcome is
limt→∞ iB = 0. In other words, the defender should give up using active cyber
defense alone, and resort to other kinds of defense methods as well (e.g., proactive
defense). If kB <
1
4z (a− b), meaning that the cost of control is not dominating,
the defender should enforce optimal control according to the initial state iB(0).
In particular, if kB = 0, meaning that the special case that the cost of control
is not counted, defender B should use the most powerful/costly active defense
mechanisms as pˆiB(t) = 1 for all t, and the outcome is that limt→∞ iB = 1,
namely that the defender will occupy the entire network.
4.2 Fast Optimal Control for Strategic Defenders against
Non-Strategic Attackers
Now we consider fast optimal control for strategic defenders against non-strategic
attackers, as motivated by the following question: Suppose the attacker maintains
a fixed degree of attack power αR and the defender initially occupies iB(0) =
i0 < ie portions of the nodes, how can the defender use optimal control to
occupy the desired ie portions of the nodes as soon as possible? More precisely,
the optimization is to minimize the sum of active defense cost and time (after
appropriate normalization), which can be described by the following functional:
JF (piB(·)) = T + λ
∫ T
0
h(piB(t))dt
where h(·) is the cost function with respect to the control function piB(·). We
consider two scenarios of cost functions: linear and quadratic. In both scenarios,
we need to identify defender B’s optimal strategy with respect to the dynamics
of (1) and a given objective ie > i0 for some hitting time T that is to be identified.
Scenario I: Fast optimal control with linear cost functions. In this sce-
nario, we have h(piB) = piB. The optimization task is to minimize the active
defense cost plus the time T :
inf
0≤piB(·)≤1
{
JF (piB(·)) = T + λ
∫ T
0
piB(t)dt
}
(9)
subject to


diB(t)
dt
= αBiB(t)(1 − iB(t))− αRiB(t)(1 − iB(t))
iB(0) = i0
iB(T ) = ie
where λ > 0 is the normalization ratio between the unit of time and the active
defense cost
∫ T
0
piB(t)dt, and i0 < ie. That is, λ, i0 and ie are given, but T is
free. Note that the active defense cost
∫ T
0 piB(t)dt includes both detection and
recovery cost, where piB(t) is the control function.
Theorem 3. The solution to the fast optimal control problem (9) is
(pi∗B, T
∗) = (1, T1), (10)
where T1 =
1
a−αR
ln
(
ie
1−ie
1−i0
i0
)
.
Proof of Theorem 3 is deferred to Appendix B. The cyber security implication
of Theorem 3 is the following. In order to achieve fast optimal control, the
defender should use the most powerful/costly active cyber defense mechanisms,
namely piB(t) = 1 for t < T
∗, until the system state becomes iB(T
∗) = ie at time
T ∗. After time T ∗, if the defender continues enforcing piB(t) = 1 for t > T
∗, then
limt→∞ iB(t) = 1, meaning that the defender will occupy the entire network.
Scenario II: Fast optimal control with quadratic cost functions. In this
scenario, we have h(piB) = pi
2
B . The optimization task is to minimize the following
sum of active defense cost and time, which differs from the linear cost (9) in that
the cost function piB is replaced with cost function pi
2
B :
inf
0≤piB(·)≤1
{
JF (piB(·)) = T + λ
∫ T
0
pi2B(t)dt
}
(11)
subject to


diB(t)
dt
= αBiB(t)(1 − iB(t))− αRiB(t)(1 − iB(t))
iB(0) = i0
iB(T ) = ie
where λ > 0 is the ratio between the unit of time and the active defense cost∫ T
0 pi
2
B(t)dt (including both recovery cost and detection cost), and i0 < ie. That
is, λ, i0 and ie are given, but T is free.
Theorem 4. The solution to the fast optimal control problem (11) is
(pi∗∗B , T
∗∗) =
{
(u∗, T2), if λ ≥
a−b
a+b−2αR
and a− b > 2(αR − b),
(1, T3), otherwise
(12)
where
u∗ =
αR − b
a− b
+
√(b− αR
a− b
)2
+
1
λ
,
T2 =
1
b+ (a− b)u∗ − αR
ln
(
ie
1− ie
1− i0
i0
)
,
T3 =
1
a− αR
ln
(
ie
1− ie
1− i0
i0
)
.
Proof of Theorem 4 is deferred to Appendix C. It cyber security implication is:
Unlike in the setting of linear cost function (Theorem 3), the defender should not
necessarily enforce the most powerful/costly active cyber defense mechanisms as
pi∗∗B is not always equal to 1. If the defender continues enforcing piB(t) = 1 for
t > T ∗∗ after the system reaches state iB(T
∗∗) = ie at time T
∗∗, the defender
will occupy the entire network, namely limt→∞ iB(t) = 1.
5 Nash Equilibria for Strategic Attacker and Defender
Now we ask the question: What if the attacker is also strategic? Analogous to the
way of modeling strategic defenders, we assume αR ∈ [b, a]. (It is straightforward
to extend the current setting αB , αR ∈ [b, a] to the setting αB ∈ [bB, aB] and
αR ∈ [bR, aR].) A strategic attacker can adjust its attack power
αR = b+ piR(a− b),
via control variable piR(·) ∈ [0, 1]. That is, the attacker can launch more sophis-
ticated attacks (i.e., greater piR leading to greater αR), which however incurs
higher cost (e.g., the investment for obtaining more powerful attack tools).
Since both the defender and the attacker are strategic, we naturally consider
a game-theoretic model. Specifically, the defender B’s optimization task is
φB(iB) = inf
0≤piB(·)≤1
{
JB(piB(·), piR(·)) =
∫ ∞
0
e−zt(fB(iB(t)) + kB · piB(iB(t)))dt
}
,
and the attacker R’s optimization task is
φR(iB) = inf
0≤piR(·)≤1
{
JR(piB(·), piR(·)) =
∫ ∞
0
e−zt(fR(iB(t)) + kR · piR(iB(t)))dt
}
,
where piB(·), piR(·) ∈ [0, 1], f
′
B(·) < 0 (as in the infinite-time horizon optimal
control case investigated above), f ′R(·) > 0 because fR(iB(t)) represents the
maintenance cost to the attacker, kR is the normalization ratio between the at-
tacker’s maintenance cost and penetration cost (which depends on the capability
of the attack tools), and kR · piR(·) is the penetration cost. Note that f
′
R(·) > 0
is relevant because the attacker may need to conduct some costly (or risky)
activities after “grabbing” a node from the defender (e.g., downloading attack
payloads from some remote server, while this downloading operation may in-
crease the chance that the compromised node is detected by active defense).
Since f ′R(·) > 0 implies dfR/diR < 0, the attacker’s optimization task for piR is
in parallel to the optimization for piB. The Hamiltonians associated to defender
B’s and attacker R’s optimization problems are:
HB(iB, piB(iB), piR(iB), p1)
= fB(iB) + kBpiB + p1[αBiB(1− iB)− αRiB(1− iB)]
= (kB + p1iB(1− iB)(a− b))piB + fB(iB) + p1biB(1− iB)− p1αRiB(1− iB);
HR(iB, piB(iB), piR(iB), p2)
= fR(iB) + kRpiR + p2[αBiB(1− iB)− αRiB(1− iB)]
= (kR − p2iB(1− iB)(a− b))piR + fR(iB) + p2αBiB(1 − iB)− p2biB(1− iB).
The adjoint equation is

p˙1 = −
∂HB
∂iB
+ zp1 = −f
′
B(iB) + p1[z − (αB − αR)(1− 2iB)]
p1(∞) = 0
p˙2 = −
∂HR
∂iB
+ zp2 = −f
′
R(iB) + p2[z − (αB − αR)(1− 2iB)]
p2(∞) = 0.
Theorem 5. Suppose fB(iB) = 1− iB, fR(iB) = iB. Then, the Nash equilibria
under various scenarios are listed in Table 1, where FB(iB) = −iB(1− iB)(a−
b)f ′B(iB)− kBz and FR(iB) = iB(1− iB)(a− b)f
′
R(iB)− kRz.
Proof of Theorem 5 is similar to the proof of Theorem 1 and omitted due
to space limitation. Its cyber security implication is: The outcome of playing
the Nash equilibrium strategies also depends on the initial system state and
the relationship between kB and kR. As illustrated in Figure 2, if kB < kR with
kRz <
1
4 (a−b), meaning that the attacker is more concerned with its control cost
(e.g., reluctant to use/expose its advanced attack tools such as zero-day exploits)
than the defender, then FB(iB) = 0 has two roots i1, i2 and FR(iB) = 0 has two
roots i3, i4. Then, we have i1 < i3 < i4 < i2 (the only possibility under the given
conditions). Therefore, the outcomes under the Nash equilibrium strategies are
summarized as follows:
– If iB(0) < i1, then iB(t) = iB(0) and iR(t) = iR(0) for all t > 0 because
pˆiB = pˆiR = 0 are the Nash equilibrium strategies.
– If i3 > iB(0) > i1, then pˆiB = 1 and pˆiR = 0 until iB = i3, which implies that
iB(t) strictly increases until iB = i3. When iB(t) = i3 at some point in time
t = t1, pˆiB = pˆiR = 1 implies iB(t) = i3 for t > t1.
Table 1. Nash equilibrium strategies for defender and attacker in various cases.
kB kR Roots of FB(iB) = 0 Roots of FR(iB) = 0 Nash equilibria
kBz <
1
4 (a− b) kRz <
1
4 (a− b) 0 < i1 < i2 < 1 0 < i3 < i4 < 1
pˆiB =


0 if iB(0) ≤ i1
1 if i1 < iB(0) < i2
0 if iB(0) ≥ i2
pˆiR =


0 if iB(0) < i3
1 if i3 ≤ iB(0) ≤ i4
0 if iB(0) > i4
kBz <
1
4 (a− b) kRz =
1
4 (a− b) 0 < i1 < i2 < 1 i3 = i4 =
1
2
pˆiB =


0 if iB(0) ≤ i1
1 if i1 < iB(0) < i2
0 if iB(0) ≥ i2
pˆiR =


0 if iB(0) < i3
1 if iB(0) = i3
0 if iB(0) > i3
kBz <
1
4 (a− b) kRz >
1
4 (a− b) 0 < i1 < i2 < 1 No real-valued roots
pˆiB =


0 if iB(0) ≤ i1
1 if i1 < iB(0) < i2
0 if iB(0) ≥ i2
pˆiR = 0
kBz =
1
4 (a− b) kRz <
1
4 (a− b) 0 < i1 = i2 =
1
2 0 < i3 < i4 < 1
pˆiB =


0 if iB(0) < i1
1 if iB(0) = i1
0 if iB(0) > i2
pˆiR =



0 if iB(0) ≤ i3
1 if i3 < iB(0) < i4
0 if iB(0) ≥ i4
kBz =
1
4 (a− b) kRz =
1
4 (a− b) 0 < i1 = i2 =
1
2 i3 = i4 =
1
2
pˆiB =


0 if iB(0) < i1
piR if iB(0) = i1
0 if iB(0) > i2
pˆiR =


0 if iB(0) < i3
piB if iB(0) = i3
0 if iB(0) > i3
kBz =
1
4 (a− b) kRz >
1
4 (a− b) 0 < i1 = i2 =
1
2 No real-valued roots pˆiB = 0, pˆiR = 0
kBz >
1
4 (a− b) kRz <
1
4 (a− b) No real-valued roots 0 < i3 < i4 < 1
pˆiB = 0
pˆiR =



0 if iB(0) ≤ i3
1 if i3 < iB(0) < i4
0 if iB(0) ≥ i4
kBz >
1
4 (a− b) kRz =
1
4 (a− b) No real-valued roots i3 = i4 =
1
2
pˆiB = 0, pˆiR = 0
kBz >
1
4 (a− b) kRz >
1
4 (a− b) No real-valued roots No real-valued roots pˆiB = 0, pˆiR = 0
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Fig. 2. Illustration of the roots of FB(iB) = 0 with fB(iB) = 1− iB , and the roots of
FR(iB) = 0 with fR(iB) = iB , where a− b = 1, kBz = 1/8 and kRz = 1/6. The x-axis
represents iB and the y-axis represents y(iB) = iB(1 − iB)(a − b). Arrows indicate
the directions the outcome under the Nash equilibrium heads for. Black-colored bars
indicate that the trajectory under the Nash equilibrium stays static.
– If i4 > iB(0) > i3, then iB(t) = iB(0) and iR(t) = iR(0) for all t > 0 because
pˆiB = pˆiR = 1.
– If i2 > iB(0) > i4, then pˆiB = 1 and pˆiR = 0 until iB = i2, which implies that
iB(t) strictly increases until iB = i2. When iB(t) = i2 at some point in time
t = t2, pˆiB = pˆiR = 1 implies iB(t) = i3 for t > t2.
– If iB(0) > i2, then iB(t) = iB(0) and iR(t) = iR(0) for all t > 0 because
pˆiB = pˆiR = 1.
If kR >
1
4 (a − b) > kB , meaning that the attacker is extremely concerned
with its control cost (e.g., not willing to easily use/expose its advanced attack
tools such as zero-day exploits) but the defender is not, then it always holds
that pˆiR = 0 because FR(iB) = 0 has no root but FB(iB) = 0 has two roots
i1 < i2. From Table 1, we see that limt→∞ iB(t) = 1 always holds, namely that
the attacker gives up using its advanced attack tools.
If both kB >
1
4 (a−b) and kR >
1
4 (a−b), meaning that both the defender and
the attacker are extremely concerned with their control costs (i.e., neither the
defender wants to easily use/expose its advanced active defense tools, nor the
attacker wants to use/expose its advanced attack tools such as zero-day exploits),
then it always holds that pˆiB = pˆiR = 0 because FB(iB) = 0 and FR(iB) = 0
have no real-valued roots. As a result, iB(t) = iB(0) for any t > 0.
The scenarios that one or both FB(iB) = 0 and FR(iB) = 0 have one root can
be regarded as degenerated cases of the above. Moreover, the cases of kB > kR
(i.e., the defender is more concerned about its control cost, such as not willing
to easily use/expose its advanced active defense tools), the outcomes under the
Nash equilibria can be derived analogously.
6 Conclusion
We have investigated how to optimize active cyber defense, by presenting opti-
mal control solutions for strategic defenders against non-strategic attackers, and
identifying Nash equilibrium strategies for strategic defenders and attackers. We
have discussed the cyber security implications of the theoretic results.
This paper brings interesting problems for future research. First, it is inter-
esting to extend the models to accommodate nonlinear fB(·) and fR(·). Second,
the models are geared toward active cyber defense. A comprehensive defense
solution, as hinted in our analysis, should require the optimal integration of re-
active, active, and proactive cyber defense. Therefore, we need to extend the
models to accommodate reactive defense and proactive cyber defense. Moreover,
it is interesting to investigate how to extend the models to accommodate moving
target defense, which has not be systematically evaluated yet [7]. Third, how to
extend the models to accommodate the underlying network structures?
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A Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. By the Dynamic Programming (DP) argument [3], we know that defender
B’s value function of the optimal solution can be defined as:
φ(iB) = inf
0≤piB(·)≤1
{
JB(piB(·)) =
∫ ∞
0
e−zt(fB(iB(t)) + kB · piB(t))dt
}
. (13)
This leads to the following Bellman equation:
zφ(iB) = inf
0≤piB(·)≤1
{
fB(iB) + kBpiB(t) + φ
′(iB)[αBiB(1− iB)− αRiB(1− iB)]
}
= inf
0≤piB(·)≤1
HB(iB, piB(t), φ
′(iB))
= inf
0≤piB(·)≤1
HB(iB, piB(t), p), where p = φ
′(iB). (14)
From (5), we know that the optimal strategy pˆiB takes the form:
pˆiB = 1kB+piB(1−iB)(a−b)<0 + uB1kB+piB(1−iB)(a−b)=0, (15)
where 1 is the indicator function. The infimum of Hamiltonian (3) is:
inf
0≤piB(·)≤1
HB(iB, piB, p)
= fB(iB) + [kB + piB(1− iB)(a− b)]1kB+piB(1−iB)(a−b)<0 + p(b− αR)iB(1− iB).
Hence, we have
zφ(iB)
= fB(iB) + [kB + piB(1− iB)(a− b)]1kB+piB(1−iB)(a−b)<0 + p(b− αR)iB(1− iB)
= fB(iB) + [kB + φ
′(iB)iB(1 − iB)(a− b)]1kB+φ′(iB)iB(1−iB)(a−b)<0 +
φ′(iB)(b − αR)iB(1 − iB). (16)
Let y(iB) = kB + φ
′(iB)iB(1− iB)(a− b). In what follows, we are to verify that
(7) satisfies (15) with φ(iB) defined by (16), which means that (7) minimizes the
Hamiltonian in the term of (13). This completes the proof.
In order to verify that (7) satisfies (15) with φ(iB) defined by (16), we dif-
ferentiate (16) with respect to iB to obtain
[(b− αR) + (a− b)1y<0]iB(1− iB)y
′ − zy − FB(iB) = 0, (17)
which can be rewritten as
y′ −
z
[(b − αR) + (a− b)1y<0]iB(1− iB)
y −
FB(iB)
[(b− αR) + (a− b)1y<0]iB(1 − iB)
= 0.
(18)
If kB + φ
′(iB)iB(1− iB)(a− b) < 0 namely y(iB) < 0, (18) should be
d
dx
[
y(x)e
−
∫
x
0
z
(a−αR)ξ(1−ξ)
dξ
]
−
FB(x)
(a− αR)x(1 − x)
e
−
∫
x
0
z
(a−αR)ξ(1−ξ)
dξ
= 0. (19)
If kB + φ
′(iB)iB(1− iB)(a− b) > 0 namely y(iB) > 0, (18) should be:
d
dx
[
y(x)e
∫ 1
x
z
(b−αR)ξ(1−ξ)
dξ
]
−
FB(x)
(b − αR)x(1 − x)
e
∫ 1
x
z
(b−αR)ξ(1−ξ)
dξ
= 0. (20)
Therefore, we only need to prove that the optimal defense strategy (7) satisfies
(17), namely (19) or (20). The proof is split into cases, depending on x residing
in interval (i2, 1) or (0, i1) or (i1, i2), or x = i1, or x = i2.
Case 1: i2 < x < 1. By (20), we have
y(x)e
∫
1
x
z
(b−αR)ξ(1−ξ)
dξ
−
∫ x
i2
FB(ζ)
(b− αR)ζ(1 − ζ)
e
∫
1
ζ
z
(b−αR)ξ(1−ξ)
dξ
dζ = 0.
Hence, we have
y(x) =
∫ x
i2
FB(ζ)
(b− αR)ζ(1 − ζ)
e
∫
x
ζ
z
(b−αR)ξ(1−ξ)
dξ
dζ. (21)
Since iB > i2, we have y(x) > 0. Therefore, we have pˆiB = 0 for iB ∈ (i2, 1).
Case 2: 0 < x < i1. By (20), we have
y(x)e
−
∫
x
0
z
(b−αR)ξ(1−ξ)
dξ
−
∫ x
i1
FB(ζ)
(b− αR)ζ(1 − ζ)
e
−
∫
ζ
0
z
(b−αR)ξ(1−ξ)
dξ
dζ = 0.
Hence,
y(x) =
∫ x
0
FB(ζ)
(b− αR)ζ(1− ζ)
e
∫
x
ζ
z
(b−αR)ξ(1−ξ)
dξ
dζ + kBe
∫
x
0
z
(b−αR)ξ(1−ξ)
dξ
=kB −
∫ x
0
a− b
b− αR
f ′B(ζ)e
∫
x
ζ
z
(b−αR)ξ(1−ξ)
dξ
dζ (22)
Since iB < i1, we have y(x) > 0. Therefore we have pˆiB = 0 for iB ∈ (0, i1).
Case 3: i1 < x < i2. By (19), we have
y(x)e
∫
1
x
z
(a−αR)ξ(1−ξ)
dξ
−
∫ x
i2
FB(ζ)
(a− αR)ζ(1 − ζ)
e
∫
1
ζ
z
(a−αR)ξ(1−ξ)
dξ
dζ = 0.
Hence
y(x) =
∫ x
i2
FB(ζ)
(a− αR)ζ(1 − ζ)
e
∫
x
ζ
z
(a−αR)ξ(1−ξ)
dξ
dζ. (23)
Since iB ∈ (i1, i2), we have y(x) < 0. This implies pˆiB = 1.
Cases 4 & 5: x = i1 or x = i2. By (21,22,23), we have y(x) = 0. If x = i1 or
x = i2, we can derive φ
′(iB) =
−kB
i∗(1−i∗)(a−b) from the definition of y(·). According
to (16), we have: zφ(i∗) = fB(i
∗) + kB
αR−b
a−b
. Differentiating with respect to i∗,
we have −i∗(1 − i∗)(a − b)f ′B(i
∗) − kBz = FB(i
∗) = 0. Consider the singular
form iB(t) = i
∗ for a period of time. We obtain that i˙B |iB=i∗= 0 and thus
pˆiB = uB =
αR−b
a−b
, where i∗ = i1 or i
∗ = i2. ⊓⊔
B Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. To solve the minimization problem, we formulate the current value Hamil-
tonian associated with (9):
HF (iB, piB , q) = λpiB + q(αB − αR)iB(1− iB)
= [λ+ q(a− b)iB(1− iB)]piB + q(b− αR)iB(1− iB).
The adjoint equation is q˙ = −∂HF
∂iB
= −q(αB −αR)(1− 2iB), with the boundary
condition
HF (i
∗
B(T
∗), pi∗B(T
∗), q(T ∗)) + 1 = 0, (24)
where T ∗ denotes the optimal hitting time that iB(T
∗) = ie, pi
∗
B(·) denotes the
optimal feedback control, and i∗B(·) denotes the corresponding trajectory.
The optimal control pi∗B is obtained by minimizing HamiltonianHF (iB, piB, q).
Since HF (iB, piB , q) is linear in piB, the optimal control pi
∗
B takes the following
bang-bang form:
pi∗B =


1 if ∂HF
∂piB
< 0
u∗B (0 < u
∗
B < 1, to be determined) if
∂HF
∂piF
= 0
0 if ∂HF
∂piB
> 0
where ∂HF
∂piB
= λ+ q(a− b)iB(1− iB). From (24), there are two possibilities: (i).
If ∂HF
∂piB
≥ 0, then 0 = b−αR
a−b
(∂HF
∂piB
− λ) + 1, which implies ∂HF
∂piB
= a−b
αR−b
+ λ is a
positive constant. (ii). If ∂HF
∂piB
< 0, then 0 = ∂HF
∂piB
+ b−αR
a−b
(∂HF
∂piB
− λ) + 1, which
implies ∂HF
∂piB
= a−b
a−αR
[
b−αR
a−b
λ − 1
]
is a negative constant. It can be seen that
only under the above (ii), the constraint iB(T ) = ie can be obtained for some T .
Then, the solution to the optimal fast control should be piB(t) = 1 for all time.
So (pi∗B , T
∗) = (1, T1), where T1 satisfies
iB(T1) =
i0
1−i0
e(a−αR)T1
1 + i01−i0 e
(a−αR)T1
= ie,
that is, T1 =
1
a−αR
ln
(
ie
1−ie
1−i0
i0
)
. This completes the proof. ⊓⊔
C Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. To solve the optimization problem, we formulate the current value Hamil-
tonian associated with (11):
HF (iB, piB, q) = λpi
2
B + q(αB − αR)iB(1− iB)
= λpi2B + q(a− b)iB(1 − iB)piB + q(b− αR)iB(1− iB).
The adjoint equation is q˙ = −∂HF
∂iB
= −q(αB − αR)(1− 2iB), and the boundary
condition is
HF (iB(T
∗∗), pi∗∗B (T
∗∗), q(T ∗∗)) + 1 = 0, (25)
where T ∗∗ denotes the optimal final time, pi∗∗B (·) denotes the optimal feedback
control, iB(·) denotes the corresponding trajectory, and iB(T
∗∗) = ie. Let D =
q(a− b)iB(T
∗∗)(1− iB(T
∗∗)). From (25) we have
HF (iB(T
∗∗), pi∗∗B (T
∗∗), q(T ∗∗)) + 1 = λ(pi∗∗B )
2 +Dpi∗∗B +
b− αR
a− b
D+1 = 0. (26)
The optimal control, pi∗∗B , is obtained by minimizing the HamiltonianHF (iB, piB, q).
Because the Hamiltonian HF (iB, piB , q) is quadratic in piB , the optimal control,
pi∗∗B , takes the following form:
pi∗∗B =


1 if − D2λ > 1
− D2λ (0 < u
∗
B < 1, to be determined) if 0 ≤ −
D
2λ ≤ 1
0 if − D2λ < 0.
From (26), we know there are three possibilities. (i). If − D2λ < 0, then 0 =
b−αR
a−b
D + 1, namely that D = a−b
αR−b
is a positive constant. (ii) If − D2λ > 1, then
0 = b−αR
a−b
D + 1, namely that D = − a−b
a−αR
(λ + 1) is also a constant. Note that
D < −2λ if and only if a − b ≤ 2(αR − b), or if and only if λ <
a−b
a+b−2αR
and
a− b > 2(αR − b). (iii). If 0 ≤ −
D
2λ ≤ 1, then
0 = λ
(
−
D
2λ
)2
− 2λ
(
−
D
2λ
)2
−
b− αR
a− b
2λ
(
−
D
2λ
)
+ 1,
namely that
D = 2
b− αR
a− b
λ−
√
4
(b− αR
a− b
λ
)2
+ 4λ
is a constant. Note that − D2λ ∈ (0, 1) if and only if λ ≥
a−b
a+b−2αR
and a − b >
2(αR − b).
In term of minimizing the Hamiltonian HF under the above case (i), we
have pi∗∗B = 0 for all time, which is impossible to obtain iB(T ) = ie; under the
above case (ii), we have pi∗∗B = 1 for all time; under the above case (iii), we have
pi∗∗B =
D
−2λ for all time. To sum up, we have
(pi∗∗B , T
∗∗) =
{
(u∗, T2) if λ ≥
a−b
a+b−2αR
and a− b > 2(αR − b)
(1, T3) otherwise
(27)
where u∗ = D
−2λ =
αR−b
a−b
+
√(
b−αR
a−b
)2
+ 1
λ
, and T2 and T3 satisfy
iB(T2) =
i0
1−i0
e(b+(a−b)u
∗−αR)T2
1 + i01−i0 e
(b+(a−b)u∗−αR)T2
= ie, iB(T3) =
i0
1−i0
e(a−αR)T3
1 + i01−i0 e
(a−αR)T3
= ie,
respectively. This completes the proof. ⊓⊔
